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Shuford: Defamation: "Real" Public Concern--A "More Apt" Test for Constitu

CASE COMMENTS
DEFAMATION: "REAL" PUBLIC CONCERN- A "MORE APT" TEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE?*
Firestonev. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972)
The divorce action of Russell A.' and Mary Alice Firestone was a "veritable
cause celebre" in social circles throughout the country.2 Comments by the trial
judge in his decree of divorce3 upon testimony of "sensational" 4 pre-divorce,
extra-marital activities led Time magazine to report that the divorce was
granted on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. 5 Since in fact the divorce
was granted for extreme cruelty and lack of domestication, Mary Alice Firestone filed a libel action against Time, Inc. Time's defense was that its news
report was constitutionally protected by the first amendment as an event of
public or general interest or concern.7 The trial court, ruling that the constitutional privilege was not applicable, determined the story was false and
defamatory,8 and rendered judgment against Time, Inc. On appeal, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that Time's report fell under
the "umbrella" of the constitutional privilege and that actual malice, necessary

*EDrroR's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring 1973 quarter.
1. Russell A. Firestone was "an heir to the immense Firestone rubber fortune." 271 So. 2d
745, 747 (Fla. 1972).
2. Id. at 751.
S. A portion of the decree read: "According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extra-marital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature
which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would
indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the
erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as unreliable.
Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the court that neither party is domesticated."
Id. at 747 n.2.
4. Id. at 747.
5. Time magazine's report was as follows: "Divorced. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41,
heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm
Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage,
one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extra-marital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl."' Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
6. Lack of domestication was not a proper statutory ground for divorce in Florida.
Nevertheless, on appeal the decree of divorce was affirmed by the Florida supreme court on
the extreme cruelty ground. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
7. Reports concerning events of public or general interest or concern are protected by
constitutional privilege. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). A plaintiff
cannot recover damages for a constitutionally privileged news report, though false and
defamatory, unless he can show the report was made with actual malice-that is, with
knowledge that the report was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
8. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
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to negate that privilege, had not been proved. 9 The Florida supreme court
reversed the district court and HELD, divorce proceedings are not of "real"
public or general concern, and news reports concerning them are not constitutionally protected. 10
"Good name and reputation" were protected at common law and are protected in state courts today by the law of defamation." A written defamatory
statement gives rise to a cause of action for the tort of libel"- if the plaintiff
can show that the statement was published," was made with actual 14 or implied 9 malice, and caused actual damage.1 6 Since the Time magazine story
in the instant libel action falsely stated that one of the grounds for the Firestone divorce was adultery, malice was implied and damages were presumed
to have been incurred by the plaintiff.Y
At common law the only defenses available to the defendant in a libel
action were truth' and two well defined types' 9 of privilege. 20 In 1964 the

9. Id. at 390.
10. 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972).
11. H. NELSON & D. Tzm7rR, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 44 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as NELSON]. "Defamation is communication which exposes a person to hatred, ridicule, or
contempt, lowers him in the esteem of his fellows, causes him to be shunned, or injures him
in his trade, business, or calling." Id.
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].

13. "Publication," in the sense used here, means written communication.
14. Actual malice contemplates ill will, hostility, and evil intention to defame or injure.
Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 606, 3 So. 211, 217 (1887). Note that actual malice as
defined by the common law differs from the definition of actual malice under the constitutional privilege. See note 7 supra.
15. Implied malice is malice the law will presume to have existed due to the nature of
the defamatory statement. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 188, 146 So. 234, 239 (1933).
16. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 751-76.
17. Libels are characterized by the courts of Florida as either libel per se or libel per
quad. Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 430-31, 46 So. 325, 330 (1908). Libel per se may be defined as a false publication of statements or charges that in their natural and proximate
consequence will necessarily cause injury to the person concerned in his personal, social,
official, or business relations of life, so that damages and malice may be presumed to exist
from the bare fact of publication itself. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 180-81, 146 So.
234, 236 (1933). A charge of immorality (the news report in the instant case) is libel per se.
For a list of the types of statements that constitute libels per se, see H. NELSON & D. TEErER,
supra note 11, at 48-69. For a definition of libel per quod and an explanation of the concept, see Ausness, Libel Per Quod in Florida, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 51 (1970).
18. If the matter charged as libelous was true and was published with good motives,
the plaintiff will not be allowed to recover. Florida Publishing Co. v. Lee, 76 Fla. 405, 411,
80 So. 245, 246 (1918). The defense of truth, as well as the right to sue for defamatory
statements, is provided for in the Florida constitution: "Every person may speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right.
No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all
criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence.
If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party
shall be acquitted or exonerated." FLA. CONsT. art. I, §4.
19. If the communication was either absolutely or qualifiedly privileged, the plaintiff
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additional defense of constitutional privilege was established in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.21 The alleged defamatory publication in that case was
a full page advertisement placed in the New York Times by a civil rights
organization, charging the Montgomery, Alabama, police with improper conduct in responding to non-violent student demonstrations at the Alabama
State College. Sullivan, claiming the advertisement defamed him as the
Montgomery Police Commissioner, sued the New York Times Co. for libel
and was awarded 500,000 dollars by an Alabama jury. The Supreme Court
of Alabama affirmed the judgment, but the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, enunciating a doctrine of far-reaching protection never before known by the press. The Court said the first amendment
compelled a ruling that public officials be prohibited from recovering damages
for defamatory falsehoods relating to official conduct unless a statement was
made with actual malice - that is, with "knowledge that it was false or with
'2
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Although initially the New York Times doctrine limited the constitutional
privilege to reports concerning official conduct of public officials in higher
public office, in 1966 the protection was extended to reports of official activities of lower public officials.23 Later, the doctrine was further expanded to
apply to the activities of one who injects himself into the "vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern" 24 and thus becomes a "public
figure." 25 Although the applicability of the New York Times doctrine seemed
to revolve around the public nature of the defamed individual, with Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker 28 the Court began to

would not recover. Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591 (1906). A publication is
absolutely privileged when, by reason of the occasion giving rise to it or because of the subject matter involved, no relief can be obtained, even though the publication may have been
made maliciously. See Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 351 (1907). Absolutely privileged
communications are those occurring in legislative and judicial proceedings and at other
government events. See Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 21 So. 109 (1896).
20. It appears a valid claim of qualified privilege was asserted by Time, Inc. in the
instant case. 271 So. 2d at 752-53. Fair and accurate reports by the press of judicial proceedings are qualifiedly privileged. Walsh v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 80 So. 2d 669,
671 (Fla. 1955); accord, Shiell v. Metropolis Co., 102 Fla. 794, 801, 136 So. 537, 540 (Fla. 1931).
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held the constitutional privilege to be applicable and
found it unnecessary to determine whether qualified privilege protected the defendant. The
Florida supreme court remanded the instant case to the district court for a determination
of the merits of the defense of qualified privilege. 271 So. 2d at 753.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 279-80.
23. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (manager of a county owned ski resort held
to be a "public official" under the New York Times doctrine).
24. Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation and Privacy- New

York Times v. Sullivan and How It Grew, 56 Ky. LJ. 718, 728 (1967).
25. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 US. 909 (1967) (Linus Pauling, Nobel Prize winner and advocate of a nuclear test ban
treaty, sued the St. Louis Democrat for publishing some defamatory cartoons and comments
about him).
26. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (joint decision).
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place less emphasis on the status of the individual involved and more emphasis
on public interest in the individual or event. Holding the constitutional
privilege applicable to both cases, the Court said Butts, a state university
athletic director, and Walker, a retired general, "commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of
27
the defamatory statements."
This continually expanding New York Times doctrine received its latest
expression in the 1971 case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 28 Rosenbloom,
a magazine distributor, was allegedly defamed by defendant's radio station
following his arrest for possession of obscene literature. The trial court ruled
the constitutional defense was not applicable, since Rosenbloom was only a
private individual. 29 The United States Supreme Court decided, however, that
the individual's status as a public official or public figure should no longer be
the controlling criterion for application of the constitutional privilege. Upholding the Third Circuit's reversal of the judgment against the defendant,o
the Court said that in determining whether the constitutional privilege is
applicable to state libel actions the test to be applied is whether the utterance
involved concerns an issue of public or general interest or concern.3 ' Thus,
if the reported news event involves a matter of public or general interest or
32
concern, the plaintiff must show actual malice on the part of the defendant.
Although apparently broadening the scope of constitutional privilege, the
Rosenbloom court left undefined the events that are of sufficient public or
33
general interest or concern to be encompassed by the privilege.
The instant case excludes at least one eventful area from the protection of
the New York Times doctrine as expanded by Rosenbloom. The Florida
supreme court ruled that although the Firestone divorce action was "unquestionably newsworthy," news reports concerning it were not constitutionally
protected because individual divorce actions are not of "real" public or general concern. 34 The court found the public "curious, titillated, or intrigued
with the scandal" of the Firestone divorce, but declared there was no logical

27. Id. at 155.
28. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
29. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
30. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).

31. The Court in setting down the test said: "mr1he First Amendment's impact upon
state libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official, public
figure, or private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory
publication concerns a matter of public or general interest.... [T]he determinant whether
the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern, albeit leaving the delineation of the reach of
that term to future cases." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (emphasis
added).
32. There was no evidence of actual malice on the part of Time magazine in the instant
case. 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 271 So. 2d 745 (1972).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. 271 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1972).
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relationship between the divorce hearing and the real concern of the public 35
Although it referred to language from the Rosenbloom decision that matters
involving "'truth, science, morality, and arts in general' as well as responsible
government"38s are encompassed within the concept of public concern, the
court determined that morality in a given marriage was not a matter of public
37
concern.
In reaching this result the court construed the Rosenbloom test in a rather
novel manner. Although the United States Supreme Court used the terms
"public interest" and "public concern" synonymously throughout Rosenbloom,
the Florida supreme court felt "public concern" was the "more apt" and preferable expression of the test.38 By then adding the word "real" to the test the
court determined the public's need to know extended only to matters of "real
public or general concern" and not to that which is in fact of public interest39
Other courts have not interpreted the public or general interest or concern
test in such a restrictive manner. 40 California courts, for example, have equated
public interest and concern with "newsworthiness," weighing such factors as
the social value of the facts published, the depth of the intrusion into private
affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of
public notoriety.41 Such a test allows the press great latitude in determining
what events are of public interest and concern. 42 In a case involving a story
about young Americans living in Europe, a federal district court in California
said that in applying the Rosenbloom test and determining the newsworthiness
of events, a court should necessarily afford the media a "great deal of latitude"
to insure freedom of the press. 43 While the Florida supreme court believes

35. Id.
36. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971) (emphasis added).
37. 271 So. 2d 745, 752 n.25 (Fla. 1972).
38. Id. at 748.
39. Id. at 748, 752.
40. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972) (electronic eavesdropping in
connection with divorce actions held to be of public interest); Gospel Spreading Church v.
Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (tax exempt interests of a church
held to be a subject of public interest); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971)
(organized crime held to be a matter of public interest); Time, Inc. v. Johnson, 448 F.2d 378
(4th Cir. 1971) (sports and retired sports figures held to be of public interest); Man v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Woodstock festival held to be of public interest); Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (unusual flight of a golf ball
hit by plaintiff held to be a matter of public interest); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969) ("exorbitant" room rates of a hotel held to be a matter of
public interest).
41. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971); Kapelias v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
42. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 824.
43. Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Discussing the

Rosenbloom test, the court said: "This court is well aware of the power of the public media
to bring virtually any person, even the most insignificant event, into its ambit as news. In
one sense, of course, all news is manufactured, for the public would generally not know of
or be interested in matters not brought to its attention by the media. Nonetheless, the right
of the public to know, and of the media to tell, is so deeply entrenched in the American
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"prurient curiosity" is "too frivolous a predicate upon which to expend constitutional energies," 44 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated in the
1972 case of Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp.45 that the scope of
protected press activity is not so limited. Although Mistrot concerned a stale
news account of a sensational double murder, published for entertainment
purposes, the court did not read Rosenbloom as limiting the first amendment
protection to "news accounts" that are purely informative. Thus, stories
written "in a style calculated to amuse or astonish" the reader and published
for the purpose of increasing circulation of a magazine were also protected. 4"
Additionally, other state courts have found that divorce actions are often
of public interest or concern. In Aquino v. Bulletin Co. 47 the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania stated divorce actions were "events of public or general interest which the press is privileged to report as news. '"48 Similarly, a Minnesota
court said once an individual has made public in divorce proceedings "intimate and indeed scandalous occurrences of his domestic life," those occurrences
become news.

49

Although a clear definition of public interest or concern, capable of predictable application, remains to be formulated by the United States Supreme
Court, Florida's attempted definition of the test may seriously curtail the exercise of free press. Overly broad and vague definitions of the standards that
govern the media's day-to-day efforts to inform the public, by necessity, force
the media to exercise self-censorship. 50 For example, it was noted in Rosenbloom that the "very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive
and protracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to
'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' thereby keeping protected discussion
from public cognizance."' 51 That Florida's test defies predictability is made
evident by its application in the instant case. The public was "beyond doubt"
interested in the Firestone divorce action.52 The plaintiff sought and received
publicity from the media.5 3 Time magazine's investigation to determine the
accuracy of the divorce decree and its proper interpretation was extensive. 54
Furthermore, Time magazine's analysis of an ambiguously worded decree was

conscience that a great deal of latitude must necessarily be afforded the media in its selection and presentation of news. Id.
44. 271 So. 2d at 752 (Fla. 1972).
45. 467 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 124.
47. 190 Pa. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
48. Id. at 536, 154 A.2d at 427.
49. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948).
50. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971).
51. Id. at 52-53.
52. 271 So. 2d at 752.
53. Id. at 751.
54. 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971). "In addition to Time's rational interpretation of the pleadings, testimony and decree, it investigated independently at length. It contacted its Miami bureau and its Palm Beach stringer several times by wire and phone to
substantiate information. Plaintiff's attorney and the judge were called for verification." Id.
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"an honest, careful attempt at truth and accuracy. '"5 Yet the court concluded
the event was not of "real" public concern. The way is therefore left open for
trial judges to exercise moral judgments in individual cases, determining that
a medium's news report is not the public's business even though the public
may be interested and even though the event is unquestionably newsworthy.
The public's right to know and the press' duty to report events of public
interest may be seriously affected by this real public concern test. Some commentators have advocated adoption of a newsworthiness test to determine
application of the constitutional privilege - whatever the press prints would
by virtue of publication be newsworthy.5 6 While such a test might lead to
abuses and infringments on the right of privacy,57 it would encourage the
ventilation of public issues and yet still provide plaintiffs with remedies for
defamations made with actual malice. 5s In addition, the citizen's reputation
could be further protected with a right-of-reply statute. 59 At any rate, moral
judgments are not proper substitutes for constitutional standards. Further
limitations on the right of the press to disseminate information should not be
encouraged and the public or general interest and concern test should be
returned to its former preeminent status in the law of defamation. The commitment of the Constitution to "robust debate" of public issues should continue to be honored. 0
BILL SHUFORD, JR.

55. Id. "The wording of the divorce decree was ambiguous. At least two reasonable
interpretations were available - that plaintiff was found an adulteress as charged in the
complaint, or that she was not an adulteress because of the incongruity of such a finding

with an award of alimony." Id.
56. See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness
Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.LA.L. Rxv. 371 (1970); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and
the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 Surp. Cr. Rxv. 267.
57. The right of the public to know is at least as important as the right to privacy in
matters as public as a divorce proceeding. In this connection it has been suggested that the
first amendment's "preferred position" entities it to more consistent protection than conflicting individual rights such as privacy. See Commentary, Pregnancy, Privacy and the Constitution: The Court at the Crossroads,25 U. FLA. L. REv. 779 (1973).
58. Comment, Constitutional Law -Freedom of the Press vs. Protection of the Reputation: Actual Malice and the New Public Interest Test, 25 ARu. L. REv. 525, 533 (1972).
59. Florida provides candidates for elective offices with the right to reply to any attack
by a newspaper on character or prior conduct in office. FLA. STAT. §104.38 (1971). The
Florida supreme court recently held this statute to be constitutional, saying it "enhances
rather than abridges freedom of speech and press protected by the First Amendment."
So. 2d
(Fla. 1973). See also Donnelly,
Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Note,
Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV. L. Rnv. 1730, 1745 (1967).
60. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
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